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CHAPTER V

THE PUNISHMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR
A. INTRODUCTORY
The probability that many prisoners of war will commit, or will be
alleged to have committed, violations of the laws, rules, and regulations of the Detaining Power specifically governing their conduct, as
well as its general criminal laws, has been demonstrated to be fairly
high, as has the tendency of Detaining Powers to desire to punish
them summariIy.l Detailed international regulation of the punishment
of prisoners of war for alleged misbehavior of any kind is therefore
of major importance in the overall system of protections afforded to
prisoners of war under international law.
In the drafting of convention provisions concerning prisoners of
war there has been a steadily increasing conflict between the desire
to provide the prisoners of war with the maximum possible protection
against arbitrary and inhumane action on the part of the Detaining
Power and its representatives and the need to permit the Detaining
Power to retain the tools necessary to enable it to maintain order
among the prisoners of war, to afford them protection from outsiders
and from the unruly amongst them, and to ensure that they will constitute a minimum security problem. 2 As the humanitarian desire to
protect prisoners of war has found greater and greater expression in
succeeding agreements, the maintenance of discipline among and control over them has become more and more difficult for the Detaining
Power intent on full compliance with the provisions of the Convention. While the 1907 Hague Regulations dealt with the subject of the
punishment of prisoners of war in the single, very general, Article 8,
the 1929 Convention included 23 articles (Articles 45-67) on the subject; and the 1949 Convention includes 27 such articles (Articles 82108) :3 and it must be borne in mind that in very large part the new
articles are procedural in nature, successively imposing additional
restrictions on the imposition of punishment on prisoners of war by
the Detaining Power.
1 See, e.g., I.M.T .F.E. 1028.
2 Hermes, Truce Tent 234-35.
3 Among the 23 articles of the

1929 Convention there were three on the subject
of escape; and among the 27 articles of the 1949 Convention there are four on that
subject (Articles 91-94). These articles on escape are discussed in detail in Chapter VII (at pp. 403-407 infra), rather than in this chapter.
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The use of force by the Detaining Power to maintain control over
prisoners of war is, of course, still a reality and it is still legal under
appropriate circumstances. While Article 42 of the Convention restricts
the use of weapons by the Detaining Power against prisoners of war
by designating such action as "an extreme measure, which shall always be preceded by warnings appropriate to the circumstances," it is
certainly implicit in the provisions of that Article that force, including
the use of firearms, may be used by the representatives of the Detaining Power when the circumstances leave no alternative if control is
to be maintained by the latter.4 Attempts to escape are specifically
recognized in that Article as one set of circumstances where the use
of weapons by guards may become necessary. Such attempts by individuals, or even by small groups of prisoners of war, do not present
a great threat to the security of the Detaining Power but, nevertheless, the guards may use weapons against the escaping prisoners of war
if this use is necessary in order to frustrate their efforts.5 Attempted
mass escapes do present such a threat and no Detaining Power can
permit, or can be expected to permit, such an effort to succeed, no
matter how much force may be necessary in order to prevent it. G
Similarly, mutinies by rebellious prisoners of war obviously cannot
be tolerated by any Detaining Power. When such an event occurs, the
Detaining Power's guards will uniformly be ordered to use truncheons,
tear gas,7 concussion grenades, and other available anti-riot instruments, and, if these prove inadequate, shotguns, rifles, machine guns,
and any other appropriate types of weapons. 8 Moreover, while at4 A postaction determination as to whether the use of weapons was actually neccessary is provided for through the medium of an inquiry conducted pursuant to
Article 121. See notes 1-379 supra and VII-47 infra.
5 Harvey, Control 135. Even the sometimes ultrahumanitarian ICRC recognizes
and accepts this as the rule. Pictet, Commentary 247.
6 The action taken by the Australians to frustrate an attempted mass escape of
Japanese prisoners of war at Cowra in August 1944 was completely legal even
though more than 100 prisoners of war were killed in the ensuing melee. Concerning this episode, see Long, The Final Campaigns 623-24. The action taken on Hitler's orders after the mass escape of British prisoners of war from Stalag Luft
III in March 1944, in which 50 recaptured officers were summarily executed by the
Gestapo, was completely illegal, as it was not done as a necessary act to frustrate
the escapes but as illegal punishment for having attempted to escape. Concerning
this episode, see The Stalag Luft III Case.
7 The Korean experience mentioned in note 8 infra was undoubtedly one of the
factors that motivated the United States, in its renunciation of the first use of riotcontrol agents, to except cases involving "rioting prisoners of war" and "escaping
prisoners." Executive Order 11850, 8April1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in
War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, 3A C.FR .. 149 (1975 compo
1976).
8 It was necessary to use many of these weapons, resulting in the deaths of a
number of prisoners of war (and of some guards) when, on order from their
military authorities in North Korea, and in execution of previously conceived and
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tempted escapes are the subject of special restrictions insofar as the
punishment of prisoners of war is concerned, 9 no such protections are
afforded to prisoners of war who engage in rioting or mutiny and they
are subject to the judicial prosecution and punishments hereinaftk
discussed. 10
In drafting the articles of the Convention relating to the punishment
of prisoners of war, the 1949 Diplomatic Conference deemed it appropriate to divide them into three major categories: (1) general provisions (Articles 82-88); (2) disciplinary sanctions (Articles 8998);11 and (3) judicial proceedings (Articles 99-108) .12 While this
division into three categories is appropriate and helpful, and will be
generally followed herein, it is believed that the allocation of subject
matter to these categories in the Convention is not entirely what it
should be. Accordingly, the discussion that follows will vary considerably from the numerical order contained in the Convention.
well-organized plans (Ball, POW Negotiations 64), at various times during 1951
and 1952 the prisoners of war held in prisoner-of-war camps in South Korea mutinied, murdered nonparticipating prisoners of war, refused to obey orders of the
representatives of the Detaining Power, and temporarily took over control of some
of the overcrowded camps. These events culminated in the mutiny in May 1952 of
thousands of prisoners of war confined at the prisoner-of-war camp located on
Koje-do Island. Concerning these episodes, see Hermes, Truce Tent 232-63; Vetter,
Mutiny, passim; Harvey, Control, passim. For the present U.S. policy on riot control in prisoner-of-war camps, see U.S. Army FM 19-40, Enemy Prisoners of War,
Civilian Internees and Detained Persons, paras. 3-71 to 3-78 (1967). For a discussion of the Code of Conduct and what the United States apparently expects of
members of its armed forces who become prisoners of war, see Walzer, Prisoners
of War, passim.
{} See pp. 403-407 infra.
10 Under Article 94 (b), Uniform Code, the maximum punishment for mutiny is
death. With respect to the special nature of prisoner-of-war mutinies, see 1947 GE
Report 204-05. One author stated (in 1951) that severe penalties for prisoners of
war are not justified and that "the question is simply and uniquely to subject them
to a certain degree of supervision and to prevent them from committing any acts
of aggression." Paquin, Le probleme des sanctions disciplinarires 52-53 (transl.
mine). He obviously did not foresee the dogma that the Communists would adopt
with respect to their personnel who became prisoners of war in Korea and Vietnam.
11 By "disciplinary sanctions," "disciplinary measures," and "disciplinary punishanent" (the words are used more or less interchangeably in the Convention), the
draftsmen of the Convention meant punishment for minor offenses that could be
imposed by the camp commander, or his appointee for the purpose, without the
necessity of formal trial. The terms may be equated to the "commander's punishment" or "captain's punishment" (aboard ship) pursuant to which most military
forces permit their commanders to impose a similar type of punishment on members of their commands. See, e.g., the power to impose "nonjudicial punishment"
granted by Article 15, Uniform Code.
12 This trichotomy originated in a recommendation of the 1947 Conference of
Government Experts. 1947 GE Report 201.
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B. PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICABILITY
1. Laws, Regulations, and Orders Applicable
Article 8 of the 1907 Hague RegUlations made prisoners of war
"subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the army of
the State in whose power they are" and authorized that State to take
appropriate measures in the event of "any act of insubordination."13
These provisions were carried over with only minor changes into
Article 45 of the 1929 Convention.14 With considerable editorial, but
little substantive, change, they became the basis for the first paragraph
of Article 82 of the 1949 Convention.15
As we have seen, the actual Detaining Power, whether or not it
was the Capturing Power, is primarily responsible for ensuring that
prisoners of war receive the treatment specified in the Convention.16
Correlative with that responsibility is the principle of the first paragraph of Article 82 making the prisoners of war subject to the laws,
regulations, and orders of the actual Detaining Power rather than to
those of the Capturing Power. Thus, if a prisoner of war is captured
by the armed forces of State A, but he is thereafter transferred to
the custody of an ally, State B, he immediately becomes subject to the
laws, regulations, and orders of State B.17 If he should subsequently
be transferred to the custody of still another ally, State G, he would
immediately cease to be subject to the laws, regulations, and orders of

13 Writing in 1942, Flory stated that in Anglo-American law "prisoners of war
have received for several hundred years national treatment when accused of
crimes cognizable by civil courts." Flory, Prisoner8 of War 93.
14 The 1947 Conference of Government Experts referred to "the fundamental
principle of Art. 45, which assimilates PW to nationals of the DP." 1947 GE Report 203.
15 For example, "the State in whose Power they are" became "the Detaining
Power"; and the last part of Article 45, sometimes translated into English as
"[t]he provisions of the present chapter, however, are reserved" [e.g., 1 Friedman
505] (a rather meaningless phrase that was often made to end with the word "controlling") became "[h]owever, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter shall be allowed" in Article 82 of the 1949 Convention.
16 See pp. 104-106 8Upra.
17 For a World War II application of this rule, see 3 Bull. JAG 465 (1944)
where prisoners of war captured by the British and Canadians had been transferred to United States custody. During the hostilities in Vietnam, all prisoners of
war captured by the armed forces of the U]lited States were transferred to the
custody of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam. They were then subject
to the laws, regulations, and orders of that Republic, and not of the United States.
(Because of the contingent responsibility of the United States as the Capturing
Power, it maintained small detachments at each prisoner-of-war camp to observe
the treatment received by the prisoners of war and to ensure compliance with the
Convention. Levie, Maltreatment in Vietnam 339-40. However, this did not affect'
the applicability of South Vietnamese laws, etc.)
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State B and become subject to those of State C, the new Detaining
Power. IS
One major problem may arise with respect to these provisions:
what laws, regulations, and orders are applicable when the Detaining
Power is not a State, but an international organization or group?
Who was the actual Detaining Power in Korea, where the prisoners of
war were stated to be in the custody of the United Nations Command?
If there were, for example, an armed conflict involving the States
composing NATO, or those composing the Warsaw Pact, could either
of those groupings claim to be the Detaining Power, rather than its
individual members?
In the unlikely event that the United Nations should itself ever
directly recruit, train, maintain, and field an armed force, it would
necessarily be the Detaining Power of any prisoners of war captured
by such force. The United Nations is not a Party to the 1949 Convention and, most probably, is not eligible to become a Party.19 While it
has, on occasion, agreed that its composite armed forces would comply
with the principles of the Convention,20 this would leave unanswered
the question of the laws, regulations, and orders to be applied by those
armed forces for the maintenance of order and the punishment of
prisoner-of-war offenses.21 It appears to be a situation that the various draftsmen of the Convention either did not envision or, if they
did, believed to be so remote a possibility that no provision covering
it was deemed necessary.

18 The foregoing statements should not be construed as being applicable to an
offense committed by the prisoner of war prior to his transfer to the custody of
the new Detaining Power.
19 Although nowhere does the Convention provide that only States may be Parties, that appears to be implicit in many of its provisions. For example, the second
paragraph of Article 2 and the first paragraph of Article 3 refer to the "territory"
of a High Contracting Party; the term "Power" is used throughout the Convention in referring to the High Contracting Parties (Article 139 opens it to accession
by any "Power") ; and the first paragraph of Article 127 refers to the "respective
countries" of the High Contracting Parties, etc. Simmonds, Legal Problems 182 is
in agreement with the foregoing conclusion. Seyersted, United Nations Forces
352-53, argues that the United Nations could accede to the Convention even though
it is not a State.
20 Simmonds, Legal Problems 175-76; Seyersted, United Nations Forces 190-92.
The Acting Secretary General of the United Nations has, on at least one occasion,
formally advised the President of the ICRC to that effect. 2 I.R.R.C. 29 (1962),
quoted in Simmonds, Legal Problems 183. For a specific United Nations directive
to this effect, see e.g., Article 44, Regulations for the United Nations Emergency
Force, ST/SGB/UNEF/1, 20 February 1957. (Article 40 of the UNFICYP Regulations is to the same effect.)
21 This question was raised by the ICRC with respect to the United Nations
Command in Korea in 1951. 1 ICRC, Conjlit de Coree, No. 220.
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In Korea the United Nations Command took the position that it was
the Detaining Power.22 Nevertheless, no statement was ever made on
its behalf concerning the applicability of the Convention.23 Having no
substantive or procedural criminal codes to govern the conduct and
punishment of prisoners of war, the United Nations Command had
no alternative but to draft and promulgate numerous such codes.24 The
propriety of such action is debatable, at the very least. It would appear
that inasmuch as the United Nations Command was composed of
national units made available by Member States and the Republic of
Korea, the State whose armed forces captured prisoners of war was
the Capturing Power as to them and that, unless and until it transferred them to custody of the armed forces of another Party to the
Convention participating in the United Nations Command, it was the
Detaining Power, and its laws, regulations, and orders were applicable. 25 A fortiori, this same conclusion must be reached with respect
to prisoners of war captured by members of the armed forces of an
international grouping such as NATO, the Warsaw Pact, etc. 2G
The second paragraph of Article 82 places a specific limitation upon
the Detaining Power with respect to any laws, regulations, or orders
22 Ibid., No. 237.
23 The statements concerning willingness or intention to comply with the "humanitarian principles" of the 1949 Convention, even though it was not then in effect,
were made by the governments of the States that had contributed armed forces
to the United Nations Command. See, e.g., ibid., Nos. 12, 15, 20, 22, 23, etc.
24 See 2 ICRC, Conflit de Coree, No. 337. These included (1) Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of the United Nations Command, 22 October 1950. (These Rules were to be applied only in trials for precapture offenses.); (2) Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedure for Military Commissions of
the United Nations Command, 6 October 1951. (These Rules were to be applied
only in trials for postcapture offenses.); (3) Regulations Governing the Penal Confinement of Prisoners of War, 20 October 1951; (4) Non-Judicial Punishment of
Prisoners of War, 19 October 1951; and (5) Articles Governing United Nations
[sic] Prisoners of War, 23 October 1951. Reference to the promulgation of these
Codes will be found in 1951 Y.B.U.N. 248. No trials were ever conducted under any
of these Rules and Regulations.
25 While Baxter, Constitutional Forms 336, states, with respect to the activities
of the United Nations Command, that "it is necessary to ask what juridical person
is responsible for the custody of prisoners of war" in Korea, unfortunately, he
does not attempt to answer that question.
26 Miller, The Law of War 279-80 suggests that the member States of military
alliances "should determine, in advance of coalition warfare, the law of the detaining power to be applied in the event of war." He gives no legal basis for such
a procedure and it would be directly contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 82 if subsequent developments indicated that the law agreed
upon and applied was other than that of the actual Detaining Power. The European Defense Community contemplated uniform community regulations on military penal law and jurisdiction that would have been applicable to aU personnel
of intergovernmental forces (and, therefore, to aU prisoners of war taken by those
forces). Williams, Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Qrdr.'Y
586-87.
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promulgated by it to govern the conduct of prisoners of war. If such
a law, regulation, or order makes punishable acts that are not punishable when committed by a member of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power, the maximum punishment imposable may be of a disciplinary nature only.27 The requirement of the second paragraph of
Article 41 that "[r]egulations, orders, notices and publications of
every kind relating to the conduct of prisoners of war" must be made
available to them in a language that they understand, etc., may also
be considered to some extent as a limitation on the disciplinary powers
of the Detaining Power,28 inasmuch as, if the Detaining Power fails
to comply with this provision, it may not punish a prisoner of war
for a violation of the directive, as to which there is, in effect, an
irrebutable presumption that he had no knowledge.
2. Miscellaneous Rules
a. DECISION AS TO THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
When a prisoner of war is alleged to have violated one of the laws,
regulations, or orders of the Detaining Power governing his conduct,
the first decision that the latter must make is as to the type of punishment warranted by the particular offending act. A similar decision
must usually be made by someone in the military hierarchy in most
armed forces before specific charges against a member of that armed
force are referred for action. 29 Moreover, Article 83 admonishes that
the competent authorities of the Detaining Power should exercise
leniency in making this decision and also that they should, if possible,
decide in favor of disciplinary, rather than judicial, measures.30
b. DOUBLE JEOPARDY31
The Convention is clear and unambiguous on the question of double
27 For a discussion of the permissible disciplinary punishments listed in the first
paragraph of Article 89, see 'Pp. 326-330 infra.
28 Concerning the second paragraph of Article 41, see p. 167 supra.
20 See, e.g., Article 30 (b), Uniform Code. In some armed forces, such as that of
the United States, the level of the court to which the case is sent for adjudication
will, in and of itself, determine the maximum punishment that may be imposed.
See, e.g., ibid., Articles 18-20.
30 The second paragraph of Article 87 carries this a step further by directing
that, in the ultimate imposition of punishment, serious consideration should be
given to "the fact that the accused, not being a national of the Detaining Power,
is not bound to it by any duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the
result of circumstances independent of his own will." (The relevance of such consideration to the case of a prisoner of war charged with rape, the murder of a
fellow prisoner of war, etc., is a little difficult to discern. For a discussion of this
problem, see p. 337-338 infra.)
31 Although Article 86 is captioned "non bis in idem" (usually translated "no
one shall be twice tried for the same offense"), it is a second punishment that is
actually prohibited by that Article, rather than a second trial. (The article headings were added by the Swiss Political Department and are not actually a part of
the Convention. 1 Final Record 369, 375.) For this reason, the imposition of even

.\J
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jeopardy.32 Article 86 states flatly that "[n]o prisoner of war may be
punished more than once for the same act, or on the same charge,"SS
3. Limitations on Punishment
There are a number of provisions that were included in the Convention in order to ensure that the punishment imposed upon prisoners
of war would, in no manner, exceed that imposed upon members of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power under similar circumstances ;
and that certain types of punishment would not be inflicted upon
prisoners of war even if they were permissible in the case of members
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. 34 Thus, the first paragraph of Article 87 provides that the only punishments that may be
adjudged against a prisoner of war shall be those that could be adjudged against a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power
who has committed the same act; and the first paragraph of Article
88 provides that the prisoner of war undergoing such punishment
shall not be subjected to more severe treatment than would be imposed
upon a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power of comparabl~ rank. 35 Obviously, these provisions establish a national standard both as to the extent of the punishment that may be adjudged
against a prisoner of war and as to the conditions under which he may
be compelled to undergo it. However, the Convention also contains
provisions with respect to punishment that may, in the case of some
Detaining Powers, establish a higher-than-national standard. Thus,
the third paragraph of Article 87 prohibits all types of collective pun-

disciplinary punishment would preclude a subsequent judicial proceeding and punishment. During World War II the Germans, on occasion, demonstrated a feeling
of frustration because an act con~idered by higher authority to be serious (relations between a prisoner of war and a German woman) had already been dealt
with by the local commander as a disciplinary matter, thus precluding judicial
prosecution. German Regulations No. 20, para. 240. But see note 32 infra.
32 Article 52, third paragraph, of the 1929 Convention was just as clear and
unambiguous-but this did not prevent the Germans from trying prisoners of war
twice for the same offense during World War II. See, e.g., the incident that occurred in Oflag 64 in late 1944 and early 1945. American Prisoners of War 36.
33 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the United Kingdom sought to add to this
article a prohibition against the increasing on appeal of the punishment imposed
below (3 Final Record, Annex 147), a practice permitted by a number of civil-law
countries. It was unsuccessful. 2A Final Record 501.
34 Provisions similar to those about to be discussed were previously to be found
in Article 46 of the 1929 Convention.
35 For a discussion of the provisions specifying a similar type of protection, as
well as others, for women prisoners of war, see p. 179 supra. Concerning retained
personnel, see pp. 73-74 supra.
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ishment,36 corporal punishment,37 imprisonment in premises without
daylight, and, generally, any form of torture or cruelty.3s The last
paragraph of Article 87 prohibits the Detaining Power from depriving
a prisoner of war of his rank, and from preventing him from wearing
his insignia of rank or nationality as an incident to any punishment
imposed.3o And the last paragraph of Article 88 provides that once a
prisoner of war has completed his punishment he "may not be treated
differently from other prisoners of war."-10
One definite problem exists with respect to the interpretation to
be given the last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 87. That
sentence states that the "courts or authorities"-1l of the Detaining
Power "shall be at liberty to reduce the penalty provided for the violation of which the prisoner of war is accused [found guilty?], and
shall therefore not be bound to apply the minimum penalty prescribed."
It would appear that this provision constitutes an attempt to modify
by international treaty the domestic criminal law of Detaining Powers.42 Thus, if such law provided that the penalty for a particular
offense was "not less than three years confinement at hard labor," the
court finding a prisoner of war guilty of that offense would, presumably, under this provision of the Convention, have the authority to
,

36 Although collective or mass punishments were likewise prohibited by the last
paragraph of Article 46 of the 1929 Convention, they were, unfortunately, not
infrequent during World War II. See, e.g., IM.T.F.E. 1089-90; American Prisoners of War 16. In Korea the Chinese similarly disregarded this prohibition. U.K.
Treatment 32. It seems likely that it will be disregarded by many Detaining Powers in any future international armed conflict. Miller, The Law of War 248, 260,
262, etc.
37 Article 33, Standard Minimum Rules, specifically prohibits the use of handcuffs, chains, irons, and straitjackets as punishments. (See also U.S. Army Regs.
633-50, para. 99d.) Such a provision might well have been included in the third
paragraph of Article 87 instead of relying on the general term "corporal punishment" as a catchall.
38 The use of torture would, of course, constitute a grave breach of the Convention even without this provision. See pp. 357-358 infra. The cited provisions of
Article 87 are the obvious source of Article 31, Standard Minimum Rules.
39 See p. 170 supra.
40 Article 92, third paragraph, specifies that despite this provision unsuccessful
escapees may, except for certain enumerated restrictions, be subjected to "special surveillance."
41 "Courts" refers to the courts of the Detaining Power, either civilian or military, having jurisdiction over prisoner-of-war offenses under the Detaining Power's domestic law (see Article 84, first paragraph) ; and "authorities" refers to the
military authorities having the power to impose disciplinary punishment (see,
Article 96, second paragraph).
42 This was seemingly understood by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference inasmuch
as the British representative "pointed out that certain difficulties might arise in
United Kingdom courts, which would be unable to apply penalties less severe than
the minimum penalty prescribed for a given offense." 2A Final Record 304-05 &
310.
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sentence him to only one year of confinement, perhaps not at hard
labor. While this could cause internal legal problems in a number of
countries, the likelihood of its actual occurrence seems rather remote. 43
C. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
As we have already seen, the Convention is here concerned with
minor offenses such as breaches of discipline, rather than major offences such as crimes.44 Always bearing in mind the provisions of
general applicability, which are, of course, applicable to disciplinary
sanctions as well as to judicial prosecutions, let us now review the
provisions of the Convention peculiar to disciplinary matters.
1. Who May Impose Disciplinary Sanctions
As in the case of most armed forces, disciplinary measures will
normally be imposed by the military commander-in this case, the
prisoner-of-war camp commander. The second paragraph of Article
96 gives him this power, at the same time indicating that this grant
is without prejudice to the competence of superior military authorities who may, of course, supplant the camp commander in this area
of prisoner-of-war management. The prisoner-of-war camp commander may delegate his disciplinary powers to one of his officers.45 The
third paragraph of Article 96 prohibits the delegation of disciplinary
powers over prisoners of war to another prisoner of war.46 It would
appear that this limitation not only prohibits such a delegation of
authority by any representative of the Detaining Power, but also prohibits the assumption of disciplinary powers by the senior prisoner of
war in the camp or by the prisoners' representative under the law of
the Power of Origin.47 Nor may there be a delegation of disciplinary
powers to, or assumption of such powers by, civilian contractors to
whom prisoners of war have been furnished as a labor force. 48
2. Procedure
The important Article 96 opens with the admonition that "[a] cts
which constitute offences against discipline shall be investigated immediately." Certainly, that admonition does not mean that the military
See Paquin, Le probleme des sanctions disciplinaires 54.
See note 11 supra.
45 During World War II German Regulations No. 10, para. 3 authorized only
camp commanders and work-detail leaders of officer rank to exercise disciplinary
powers over prisoners of war.
46 Apparently, the United States did permit this practice during World War II,
at least with respect to the Italian Service Units. Lewis & Mewha 186.
47 JAGW 1965/1325,22 September 1965. See also British Manual, para. 159 n.2,
stating that courts-martial of the Power of Origin may not convene in a prisonerof-war camp. See also p. 336 infra, concerning prisoner-of-war "kangaroo" courts.
48 Anon., Employment in Germany 323. See German Regulations No. 27, para.
386.
43

44
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authorities of the Detaining Power may not completely disregard a
breach of discipline by a prisoner of war if they choose to do so. In
other words, it does not purport to require that every breach of discipline be investigated and punished. What it undoubtedly seeks to
ensure is that disciplinary proceedings with respect to minor offenses
will not be delayed, perhaps until the prisoner of war concerned is
no longer able to produce supporting testimony, or, perhaps, has himself forgotten the exact details of the incident out of which arose the
proposal to punish.
The fourth paragraph of Article 96 establishes the method by which
a determination is made as to whether disciplinary punishment is warranted and should be imposed. The accused prisoner of war must be
advised of the charge being made against him; he must be given an
opportunity to defend himself, including an opportunity to explain
his conduct and to call witnesses in his behalf; and, if necessary, he
must be provided with a qualified interpreter. Both the accused prisoner of war and the prisoners' representative must be advised of the
decision. Moreover, the last paragraph of Article 96 contains a new
provision under which the camp commander is required to maintain
a record of all disciplinary punishments imposed, and this record
must be open to inspection by the representatives of the Protecting
Power. This is a modest attempt to prevent the military authorities
of the Detaining Power from imposing punishment secretly and without any justification.49
3. Prehearing Confinement
One entire article, plus a portion of another, is devoted to the subject of prehearing confinement. 5o The first paragraph of Article 95
establishes the applicability of the national standard: a prisoner of
war may not be subjected to prehearing confinement unless a member
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power' would be so subjected if
charged with a similar offense. This paragraph concludes with an
exception to the national standard: "[unless] it is essential in the
interests of camp order and discipline." It would seem that this exception opens the door to improprieties on the part of the military
authorities of the Detaining Power. Any conduct truly making confinement "essential in the interests of camp order and discipline" would
40 One author has written that this provision "constitutes one of the most remarkable advances realized in the new Convention." Paquin, Le probleme des sanctions disciplinarires 58 (trans!. mine). While it will unquestionably be of value,
that statement would appear to exaggerate its importance considerably.
50 The logic of this emphasis on the subject becomes obvious when it is consid- .
ered that while the maximum duration of confinement that may be imposed in a
disciplinary 'Proceeding is 30 days (see pp. 327-328 infra), without this protection
there would assuredly be many instances in which the prisoner of war was kept in
pre-hearing confinement for a period in excess of that maximum.
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certainly be of such magnitude that similar conduct on the part of a
member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power would result in
the offender's being subjected to prehearing confinement (or, more
probably, being charged with an offense calling for judicial prosecution, rather than disciplinary punishment). Accordingly, there was
no need for the exception, and it merely constitutes an excuse for
violations of the preconfinement provision of the Convention.1i1
The second paragraph of Article 95 mandates the reduction of prehearing confinement of prisoners of war to a minimum and sets an
outer limit of 14 days for such confinement. The first paragraph of
Article 90 directs that the period spent in prehearing confinement be
deducted from the punishment ultimately imposed in the disciplinary
proceedings. Including the 14-day limit was an improvement over the
relevant provision of the 1929 Convention, as was the requirement
that the time spent in prehearing confinement be deducted from the
punishment imposed. 52
Finally, the third paragraph of Article 95 prescribes the conditions
under which such prehearing confinement is to be served. Inasmuch
as the same rules apply to both prehearing confinement and confinement served pursuant to the decision reached after the disciplinary
hearing, the subject will be discussed immediately below in connection
with authorized disciplinary punishments.
4. Authorized Disciplinary Punishments
The first paragraph of Article 89 specifies the four types of punishment that may be imposed upon prisoners of war in disciplinary proceedings. These four types of punishment are exclusive; no other
types of punishment may be imposed as a result of disciplinary proceedings, even if the laws of the Detaining Power permit the imposition of additional types (or more severe punishment for these types)
upon members of its armed forces (see below).
a. FINES
It may seem strange that the Convention should provide for a monetary sanction against prisoners of war, but reflection will indicate the
logic of such a sanction. As we have seen, there are a number of provisions ensuring prisoners of war an income,53 albeit a very small one,
1i1 DUring the discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the French representative stated that he "saw no objection to modifying the last part of the first
paragraph [of Article 85, later renumbered Article 95] because of the wide interpretation it made possible." 2A Final Record 493. Presumably, he was referring
to the clause complained of in the text. No further reference to the matter could
be located in the Conference discussions.
52 The third paragraph of Article 47 of the 1929 Convention provided for such
a deduction-but only if it was granted to members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power. The deduction is no longer dependent upon that contingency.
53 See pp. 194-206 supra.
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primarily in order to enable them to make purchases at the camp
canteen. lSi Accordingly, cutting off that income, or any part of it, is a
meaningful sanction. However, paragraph (1) of Article 89, in authorizing a fine as disciplinary punishment, limits the" amount thereof to
50 percent of the combined advances in pay and working pay that
would accrue to the prisoner of war during a 30-day period. IUS
b. DISCONTINUANCE OF PRIVILEGES IN EXCESS OF
THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE CONVENTION.
While it is not a situation that prevails widely, there are occasions
when a Detaining Power grants to prisoners of war privileges not
required by the Convention. 56 However rare this may be, it was appropriate to include the authority to withdraw such a privilege as one of
the potential disciplinary punishments. Absent such a right to withdraw a gratuitous privilege from a particular prisoner of war for
misconduct, few Detaining Powers would ever find it possible to grant
such privileges. 51
c. FATIGUE DUTIES
This punishment consists of extra-duty chores (beyond regular work
hours and beyond normal duty-roster assignments), such as policing
of the prisoner-of-war camp grounds, kitchen police, etc. 58 The imposition of such extra fatigue duty as disciplinary punishment is limited
to 2 hours per day; and Article 90 limits the overall duration to SO
days.
d. CONFINEMENT
The draftsmen of the Convention considered that no explanation
was necessary concerning this type of disciplinary punishment. However, they did consider it necessary to include a mass of provisions
placing limitations on the nature and conditions of the confinement;
either indirectly (Articles 90, 87, and 89), or directly (Articles 97
and 98). Thus the first paragraph of Article 90 restricts the duration
Concerning camp canteens, see pp. 143-145 supra.
The lCRC has computed this maximum fine to be 7.25 Swiss francs. Pictet
Commentary 437. For sample conversions to other monetary systems, see note
II-431.
1!6 For an example of a grant to prisoners of war beyond the requirement of the
1929 Convention during World War II, see note II-427 supra.
51 Some will argue that any privilege granted by a Detaining Power beyond the
requirements of the Convention may be withdrawn by the Detaining Power at any
time and without any need to justify its action. While there is considerable merit
to this argument when the Detaining Power is withdrawing the privilege completely (even though it may, under some circumstances, resemble collective punishment) , its status as punishment becomes obvious when the privilege is withdrawn
from only one prisoner of war while the others retain it.
58 The second paragraph of Article 89 makes this type of disciplinary punishment inapplicable to officers.
54

ISIS
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of any single punishment to 30 days; and this restriction would, of
course, apply to confinement imposed as disciplinary punishment. The
third paragraph of Article 87 prohibits "imprisonment" in premises
without daylight; and this, too, would apply to confinement imposed
as disciplinary punishment. The last paragraph of Article 89 bans
generally any disciplinary punishment that is inhuman, brutal, or
dangerous to the health of the prisoners of war; and this, too, would
apply to confinement imposed as disciplinary punishment. 59 And Articles 97 and 98 contain detailed and specific rules concerning the conditions under which confinement imposed upon prisoners of war as
disciplinary punishment is to be served. Thus, prisoners of war undergoing disciplinary punishment may not be confined in a penitentiary
type of establishment (Article 97, first paragraph) ; the establishment
in which they are confined must meet the sanitary requirements of
Article 25 60 and the confined prisoners of war must be able to maintain their personal cleanliness as required by Article 29 61 (Article 97,
second paragraph) ; they must be permitted to attend the daily medical
inspection,62 to receive any appropriate medical treatment and, if necessary, to be removed to a medical facility (Article 98, fourth paragraph) ; they must be allowed at least two hours of exercise daily in
the open air (Article 98, third paragraph) ; they must continue to be
accorded the benefits of the Convention including the rights granted
by Article 78 to make complaints with respect to the conditions of their
confinement63 and by Article 126 to confer privately with the representatives of the Protecting Power 64 (Article 98, first paragraph) ; they
must be granted the right to read and write and to send and receive
correspondence 65 (Article 98, last paragraph) ; officer prisoners of war
may not be confined in the same quarters as noncommissioned officers
or enlisted men (Article 97, third paragraph); and no prisoner of war
may be deprived of the prerogatives attached to his rank (Article 98,
second paragraph).
There are still other rules governing the performance of disciplinary punishment. As has been noted immediately above, no such punishment may exceed a duration of 30 days. The second paragraph of
59 Actually, the cited portions of the third paragraphs of Articles 87 and 89
apply only to confinement and, possibly, but rarely, to fatigue duties.
60 See pp. 124-125 supra.
61 See pp. 132-133 supra.
62 See pp. 133-134 supra.
63 See pp. 285-301 supra.
64 See pp. 281 and 283 supra.
65 The last paragraph of Article 98 authorizes the temporary detention, until the
termination of the confinement, of parcels and of remittances of money. Concerning the implementation of this provision, and of the further provision of that last
paragraph of Article 98 with respect to the disposition of perishable items in parcels, see p. 306 supra.
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Article 90 specifies that this rule is applicable even if the disciplinary
proceedings are concerned with several different acts of misconduct,
related or unrelated, of the prisoner of war. The third paragraph of
Article 90 requires that the disciplinary punishment be put into effect
within one month of being imposed. 66 And the last paragraph of
Article 90 provides that when a second disciplinary punishment is imposed upon a prisoner of war (as, for example, for some act committed
while he is serving the punishment imposed earlier), and either of
the two punishments exceeds 10 days in duration, a period of at least
3 days must elapse between the conclusion of the first punishment and
the commencement of the second. 67 And the first paragraph of Article
115 prohibits the Detaining Power from denying repatriation or accommodation in a neutral country to a prisoner of war merely because
he has not completed serving the disciplinary punishment that has
been imposed upon him.68
One legal problem that arises in the area of disciplinary punishment
is the limitation to be applied when the national law of the Detaining
Power differs from that of the Convention provisions discussed above.
While the first paragraph of Article 82 makes prisoners of war
subject to the laws, regulations, and orders in force in the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, it also contains the limitation that "no
proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of this Chapter
shall be allowed." Accordingly, if the law of the Detaining Power
permits a more severe disciplinary punishment than does the Convention (as, for example, if such law permits 'the military commander to
impose a disciplinary punishment of confinement for 60 days), the
answer is simple: the limitation contained in the Convention is applicable. But what if the disciplinary punishment authorized by the law
of the Detaining Power is less than the Oonvention permits 1611 A
proper construction of the first part of the first paragraphs of Article
82 and of Article 87 would appear to limit the imp os able punishment

66 The need for this provision is rather difficult to discern, as no possible advantage to the Detaining Power can be discovered in a delay in the execution of the
punishment, whatever its nature may be.
67 This rule is apparently applicable even if the two disciplinary punishments
imposed are of a different nature, as, for example, where the first is confinement
for 20 days and the second is a fine of 50 percent of the advances of pay for 30 days.
68 See p. 413 infra.
60 After World War I an English scholar called attention to the problem that
the British had encountered in this regard, as their law did not permit officers to
be subjected to disciplinary punishment and rest~icted such punishment for other
ranks to 28 days' detention. Belfield, Treatment 141. For a similar problem that
will confront the United States in this area, see note '10 infra.
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to the maximum allowed under the national law of the Detaining
Power. 70
The foregoing discussion has undoubtedly demonstrated the lengthy
and detailed provisions that the 1949 Diplomatic Conference felt itself
constrained to include in the Convention in order to place upon the
Detaining Power restrictions upon the imposition of disciplinary punishment that would be so clear that their evasion would be extremely
difficult, and so comprehensive that there would be neither need nor
opportunity for the Detaining Power to improvise.

D. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. Laws, Regulations, and Orders Applicable
It will be recalled that Article 82 makes prisoners of war amenable
to the laws, regulations, and orders of the Detaining Power. In addition, the first paragraph of Article 99 prohibits the punishment of a
prisoner of war for the commission of an act that was not an offense
against the law of the Detaining Power or against international law
at the time it was allegedly committed-in effect, a ban on ex post
facto criminal laws. (This might well have been made applicable to
disciplinary punishments also.) The second paragraph of Article 99
prohibits the use of "moral or physical coercion" as a means of inducing a prisoner of war to confess his guilt of the offense with which he
is charged. 71 (This, too, might well have been made applicable to disciplinary punishments.)
Experience during World War II and in Korea would seem to indicate that rather general violations of this latter provision can be expected to occur as a governmental policy based upon the legal and
political systems of a particular country. Thus, because the Soviet legal
system had always relied heavily on confessions, during World War
II the Soviet practice with respect to German prisoners of war was
to use the whole gamut of moral and physical coercion (from a bribe
70 Thus, while the Convention permits the disciplinary punishment of confinement for officer prisoners of war [Article 88, paragraph one], with the limitation
that they may not be confined with noncommissioned officers and enlisted men
[Article 97, third paragraph], Article 15, Uniform Code, does not permit their
confinement- only their arrest in quarters or restriction to specified limits. Officer
prisoners of war should be given the benefit of such a national limitation on disciplinary punishment. U.8. Manual, para. 172b, appears to be to the contrary, stating that an officer imposing disciplinary punishment on prisoners of war "is not
subject to the limitations on the duration of commanding officers' nonjudicial punishment established by Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice." However, U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 98, which is a later and more authoritative
directive, contains no such statement.
71 During World War II the conviction of two prisoners of war by a United
States court-martial was set aside because during the investigation the interpreter had, pursuant to instructions of the investigating officer, told them that if they
confessed "things would be much easier on them." 4 Bull. JAG 421 (1945).
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consisting of the promise of a light sentence to extreme physical torture) in order to obtain confessions from prisoners of war accused
of war crimes ;72 and, while the post-Stalin era has brought some
changes in this area of the Soviet legal system, it remains to be seen
whether a change in basic philosophy has actually occurred. 73 Similarly, in Korea, despite their protestations concerning the "lenient policy"
applied in the treatment of prisoners of war, the Chinese ,Communists
regularly used torture to obtain confessions, even to the commission
of offenses that they well knew the prisoner of war had not committed.u Nothing in the post-Korea record of the People's Republic of
China iZ\dicates any change, except for the worse, in this basic philosophy.75 And there are undoubtedly other, less important, countries from
which the same disregard of provisions prohibiting coercion to obtain
confessions can be expected.76
2. Pretrial Procedures
Article 103 directs that the judicial investigation of an alleged
prisoner-of-war offense be conducted as rapidly as circumstances permit so that the trial, if any, may take place as soon as possible. Once
again, the Convention is not encouraging the Detaining Power to
prosecute prisoners of war;77 it is merely emphasizing the requirement
for a speedy trial when it is determined that the offense allegedly committed by the prisoner of war warrants judicial prosecution, that requirement being based on the same general reasons that apply in the
case of other trials.
The provisions of the Convention concerning pretrial confinement
are, mutatis mutandis, similar to those dealing with the subject of
prehearing confinement in disciplinary cases. 78 The first paragraph of
Article 103 prohibits placing a prisoner of war in pretrial confinement
unless a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power charged
with a similar offense would be so confined-but here again there is
an exception, this one being applicable "if it is essential to do so in
Miller, The Law of War 226.
The entire thesis of Solzhenitsyn's The Gulag Archipelago (1973) suggests
otherwise. Brockhaus, The U.S.S.R. 292, also suggests doubts-but his article was
written in 1956.
74 U.K., Treatment 24.
7G Professor Cohen finds it "ludicrous" to believe that the PRC could be expected
to comply with any of the provisions of the Convention dealing with the subject
of penal and disciplinary sanctions Miller, The Law of War 247. Cohen goes on
to say that "the principles of nulla poena sine lege [and, presumably, e:e post
facto], of no coerced confessions, and of opportunity to make a defense and to be
represented by qualified counsel are simply not practiced in China." Ibid.
76 With respect to the application of the laws of the Detaining Power concerning
offenses punishable by death, see pp. 339-340 infra.
77 See the discussion of Article 96, the parallel article dealing with disciplinary
punishment, at pp. 324-325 supra.
78 See pp. 325-326 supra.
72

73
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the interests of national security."79 It is highly improbable that
the national security of a Detaining Power would ever be adversely
affected by the failure to place in close confinement a single prisoner
of war who is already confined behind the barbed wire of a prisoner-ofwar camp. As in the case of disciplinary punishment,80 this exception
merely affords the Detaining Power an excuse for confining a prisoner
of war awaiting judicial prosecution when a member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power would not be so confined. And while
the first paragraph of Article 103 concludes with an absolute prohibition against pretrial confinement in excess of three months,81 presumably this provision, too, will be disregarded "in the interests of national security."
. Further specific provisions with respect to pretrial confinement include the second paragraph of Article 103 which, like the first paragraph of 90 with relation to displinary punishments, provides for the
deduction of the period of pretrial confinement from any sentence
ultimately pronounced against the prisoner of war ;82 and the last paragraph of Article 103 which makes the requirements and protections
of Article 97 and 98, included in the provisions limited to judicial
punishments,83 fully applicable to pretrial confinement.8t
79 A proposal to delete this provision was rejected at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference with a number of representatives stating their positions with respect to
the proposal. 2A Final Record 317.
80 See pp. 325-326 supra.
81 This is another method of attempting to bring pressure on the Detaining
Power to expedite the reaching of a decision whether to prosecute and to bring the
case to trial promptly if trial is the decision reached.
82 The second paragraph of Article 103 concludes with a clause providing that
the period of pretrial confinement shall also be "taken into account in fixing any
penalty." A proposal to delete it, made at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, was not
acted upon. 2A Final Record 317, 327. This clause is either redundant or requires
that the prisoner of war be given dual credit for pretrial confinement. (If the
prisoner of war has served two months in pretrial confinement and the court believes that the circumstances of the offense of which he is subsequently found
guilty are such that he should receive a one-year sentence, does the sentencing
judge take the pretrial confinement "into account in fixing [the]penalty" and sentence the prisoner of war to only 10 months in posttrial confinement? And then doe:!
the commanding officer of the place of confinement deduct the pretrial confinement
from the sentence actually pronounced, reducing the period to be served to 8
months? This is a logical interpretation of the overall provision, even though it
certainly was not the result intended by the Diplomatic Conference.)
83 For a discussion of the coverage of these two articles, see pp. 327-328 supra.
84 Rather strangely, the only prolonged discussion of the provisions of Article
103 at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was concerned with the right (that was
found to exist) of the Detaining Power to transfer to another prisoner-of-war
camp a prisoner of war awaiting trial. 2A Final Record 312 & 317. That decision
was apparently reached without any consideration being given to the difficulties it
might create for the defense in preparing a case for trial and in trying it at a substantial distance from the place of the occurrence of the alleged offense.
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The routine to be followed before trial is laid out in detail in the
Convention. The first paragraph of Article 104 provides that when the
Detaining Power decides to proceed with a judicial prosecution against
a prisoner of war it shall so notify the Protecting Power. The notifica~
tion must be received by the Protecting Power at least three weeks
before the date that the trial is to begin.85 Compliance with this provi~
sion is jurisdictional,86 inasmuch as the last paragraph of Article 104
states that unless evidence is presented at the opening of the trial that
such notice was received by the Protecting Power, the prisoners' repre~
sentative, and the accused prisoner of war,87 the trial must be ad.

85 The second paragraph of Article 104 enumerates in detail the information that
the notice must contain: (1) specified identity material; (2) the place at which
the accused prisoner of war is interned or confined; (3) the charges on which he
is to be tried, with the law applicable; and (4) the court in which he is to be tried,
with the date and place for the opening of the trial. The third paragraph of Article
104 requires that the same notice be furnished by the Detaining Power to the prisoners'representative. (During World II the United States decided that the requirement of notice to the Protecting Power did not apply to trials by summary courtsmartial, the inferior court in the United States hierarchy of courts-martial.
SPJGW 1944/1873, 8 Apri11949; 3 Bull. JAG 135 (1944). While the desire to be
able to impose minor punishments promptly was understandable, it is doubtful that
such a decision would constitute compliance with Article 104 of the 1949 Convention. However, it is apparently intended to continue with the same interpretation
as U.S. Army Regs. 655-50, para. 108a provides for such notice only in the case
of trial by general or special court-martial.)
86 Sec U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 108d; British Manual, para. 222 & n.3. In
Public Prosecutor 11. Koi, [1968] A.C. at 860, the members of the Privy Council,
although disagreeing on other issues, were apparently unanimous in finding that
the trial court should have, as to one defendant, "refrained from continuing the
trial in the absence of notices [pursuant to Article 104]." For a similar decision
reached during World War II, see Rex 11. Giuseppe. During and after World War
II the United States Supreme Court held that compliance with the comparable
notice provision of the 1929 Convention did not apply to trials for offenses against
the law of war (Johnson 11. Eisentrager), or to trials for precapture offenses
(Matter of Yamashita). In view of the provisions of Article 85 of the 1949 Convention, compliance with Article 104, as well as all of the other articles relating
to judicial prosecution, is now required even when the prosecution is for one of
these offenses, if the accused falls within one of the categories specified in Article
4. See pp. 379-382 infra.
87 This is the only provision indicating a requirement that a copy of the notice
referred to in the first two paragraphs of Article 104 must also be served on the
accused prisoner of war. The requirement that particulars of the charge be furnished to the prisoner of war is contained in the fourth paragraph of Article 105.
That provision does not include all of the detail of the second paragraph of Article
104, nor does it specify the three-week notice, but merely "in good time before the
opening of the tria!''' However, the last paragraph of Article 104 establishes the
fact that a minimum of three weeks is required in order to be "in good time before
the apening of the trial."
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journed, presumably for a period sufficiently long to complete the
proper advance-notice period. 88
Article 105 is the bill of rights for prisoners of war. A copy of the
charges on which he is to be tried, together with any other documentation that, under the law of the Detaining Power, would be furnished
to a member of its armed forces being tried under the same circumstances, must be served upon him "in good time before the opening of
the trial"89 and in a language thafhe understands, while an identical
copy thereof must be provided to his counsel (Article 105, fourth paragraph) ; the accused prisoner of war is entitled to the assistance of a
fellow prisoner of war, of qualified counsel of his own choice, and of
a competent interpreter if he considers this latter necessary;90 and he
must be advised of these rights by the Detaining Power far enough
prior to the trial to make them meaningful and to ensure compliance
with other provisions containing time limitations (Article 105, first
paragraph) ; if the prisoner of war cannot, or does not, himself obtain
the assistance of counsel, the Protecting Power must do so for him,91
being allowed one week to accomplish this mission, and being authorized to call upon the Detaining Power for a list of qualified counsel
if it so desires; and if the Protecting Power does not select counsel
within the time allotted, the Detaining Power is obligated to appoint
competent counsel for the prisoner of war (Article 105, second paragraph) .92 Once appointed, counsel for the accused prisoner of war
must be allowed a minimum of two weeks prior to the beginning of
the trial in which to prepare the defense and he must be afforded ade88 Concerning the problems related to judicial prosecutions when there is no Protecting Power, see 1 ICRC Report 352-64. See also British Manual, para. 222 n.3.
89 The fourth paragraph of Article 105 uses the term "shall be communicated"
to the prisoner of war. In the overall context of these provisions, it is clear that
this particular communicating must be done in writing. (The "fundamental guarantees" listed in Article 75 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I should be read in connection
with this paragraph of the text.)
90 During World War II an opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the United
States Army held that, barring a specific request of the accused prisoner of war,
it was not necessary that every word of the judicial proceedings be translated for
him as long as he knew "the charges and specifications upon which he is arraigned,
the general nature of the testimony given for and against him, and the substance
of the arguments made by the trial judge advocate [prosecutor] and his counsel."
SPJGW 1945/2241, 5 March 1945.
91 German Regulations No.2, para. 7 provided that if the prisoner of war
selected his own counsel, he was to bear the expense; but that if the Protecting
Power made the selection, it was to bear the expense. (Of course, in this latter
case, the Protecting Power would be reimbursed by the Power of Origin.)
92 U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, No. 109b provides, without qualification, that "at
least one United States officer will serve as defense counsel (or assistant) in every
general or special court-martial" of a prisoner of war. It is doubtful that such
counsel could, or should, serve-even as an assistant-in the face of objection by
the accused prisoner of war.
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quate facilities for this purpose, being permitted to consult his client
freely and in private,93 and also to interview witnesses for the defens~
[Article 105, third paragraph] .94
3. Courts
The basic provisions with respect to the type of courts in which a
prisoner of war may be tried are contained in Articles 8495 and 102.
Once again, the standard selected is the national standard of the Detaining Power, Article 102 providing that he must be tried "by the
same courts ... as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power" and the first paragraph of Article 84 providing that
he may be tried only by a military court unless the "existing laws"96
of the Detaining Power "expressly permit" the trial of members of
its own armed forces by civil courts. 97 Most countries authorize, and
will probably prefer to conduct, the trials of prisoners of war in military tribunals. 98 But trying prisoners of war in the same courts that
try members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power does not
necessarily assure a fair trial for the prisoner of war.99 Accordingly,
93 During World War II the Germans permitted prisoners of war to communicate with their counsel, but only in writing, until the day before trial when a
personal conference was permitted. German Regulations No. 25, para. 349. The
third paragraph of Article 105 remedies a patent defect in the 1929 Convention.
94 The first paragraph of Article 105 gives the prisoner of war the right to call
witnesses. A denial of the trial rights enumerated in the text can constitute a grave
breach of the Convention, See pp. 363-365 infra.
IHi While Article 84 is concerned solely with courts, and therefore has no relevance to disciplinary punishments, it was, for some indiscernible reason, included
under the rubric "General Provisions," rather than under the more appropriate
"Judicial Proceedings." For this reason it was not mentioned in the discussion of
the former.
91l If the term "existing laws" was used as a method of precluding Detaining
Powers from changing their laws in midwar in order to authorize the trials of
prisoners of war by civil courts, the purpose was not accomplished.
97 During World War II several prisoners of war held in Canada were charged,
tried, and convicted of the murder of a fellow prisoner of war in a civil court. OIl;
appeal, they contended that the civil courts were without jurisdiction. The Supreme
Court of Alberta held that under Canadian law not only could the civil courts try
Canadian servicemen, but that they had exclusive jurisdiction over the offense of
murder. Rex v. Perzenowski.
98 See, e.g., Article 2 (9), Uniform Code; and Berman & Kerner, Soviet Military
Law and Administration 106. Article 102 of the Convention is, in effect, a reiteration of the requirement of the first paragraph of Article 84 that prisoners of war
may be tried only in the courts that would have jurisdiction to try members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power.
99 In the post-World War II Trial of Harukei Isayama for having executed
American airmen after a purported trial that was, in fact, little more than a farce
-one that was lacking in every vestige of fairness- the defense argued that the
conduct of that trial (false evidence, denial to the defense of the opportunity to
obtain evidence, denial of counsel, failure to interpret the proceedings, etc.) was
the same that would have been accorded Japanese servicemen. The court obviously
did not accept this as a valid defense.
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the second paragraph of Article 84 adds some specific requirements
with respect to such courts. They must offer the essential guarantees
of (1) independence (not subjected to direction by the military commander or civilian executive) ; (2) impartiality; and (3) the trial safeguards set forth in Article 105.100
It is, perhaps, relevant to mention one type of court which is not, and
never has been, a legal one-the court created and manned and whose
decisions are executed by the prisoners of war themselves. Prisoners
of war are subject to the laws and the courts of the Detaining Power
for their behavior in the prisoner-of-war camp while they remain in
that status; and they are subject to the laws and the courts of their
Power of Origin for their behavior in the prisoner-of-war camp when
they have returned to the custody of their own armed forces. 101 At no
time are they ever legally subject to the jurisdiction of kangaroo courts
consisting of fellow prisoners of war. 102
4. Trial Procedure
The 1949 Convention contains very little with respect to the actual
conduct of the trial of a prisoner of war. This is understandable, because in this area the standard procedures established by the laws of
the Detaining Power will necessarily govern. There are, however, a
few items that warrant discussion.
It has been seen that the trial of a prisoner of war must open with
evidence that there has been compliance with the provisions of Article
104 relating to notice to the Protecting Power, the prisoners' repre·
sentative, and the accused prisoner of war ;103 the last paragraph of
Article 105 authorizes representatives of the Protecting Power to at-

100 For a discussion of the trial safeguards of Article 105, see pp. 334-335 supra.
In its Niirnberg Principles, the International Law Commission was much more
terse, but probably just as cogent. Principle V states: "Any person charged with
a crime under international law has a right to a fair trial on the facts and law."
101 See, e.g., Article 105, Unifor1n Code; Article 29, U.S.S.R. Law of December
25, 1958. After Korea the United States tried several members of its armed forces
for misconduct while in Communist prisoner-of-war camps. United States v. Floyd;
United States v. Batchelor; etc.
102 There were a number of incidents involving fanatical Nazis who tried, convicted, and executed fellow German prisoners of war who were judged to be insufficiently motivated. See, e.g., Rex v. Werner; and 5 Bull. JAG 262 (1946). (Some
years ago considerable publicity was given in Canada to a charge that in Holland
in 1945 Canadian troops had provided German prisoners of war with weapons with
which to carry out two death sentences imposed by a German prisoner-of-war
court. There does not appear to have been any acceptable factual resolution of the
charge.) There were many such incidents on the part of ianatical Communists
interned in the United Nations Command prisoner-oi-war camps in Korea. UNC,
Communist War 26-27.
103 See pp. 333-334 supra.
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tend the triaP04 except when it is held in camera "in the interest of
State security" ;105 the last paragraph of Article 99 provides that no
prisoner of war "may be convicted without having had an opportunity
to present his defense" and the assistance of qualified counsel; and
Article 102 permits the sentencing of a prisoner of war only "if the
sentence has been pronounced by the same courts according to the
same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the
Detaining Power," with the further proviso that all of the provisions
of the Convention concerned with penal sanctions must have been
observed. 10G
It is obvious that these specific trial requirements do not deviate
materially from the national standard-unless the national standard
is so far below the norm as to leave no doubt that a fair trial is virtually impossible. 1 0 7 Even then the Convention assures the prisoner of
war undergoing judicial prosecution only of an opportunity to be
assisted by counsel, to present a defense, and to have a neutral observer persent--certainly not very far-reaching innovations under the legal
systems of most countries.
5. Sentencing
The first paragraph of Article 87, as we have seen, provides that the
only punishments that may be adjudged against a prisoner of war shall
be those that could be adjudged against a member of the armed forces
of the Detaining Power who has committed the same act. The second
paragraph of Article 87 provides that in adjudging the punishment,
after a prisoner of war has been found guilty of an offense charged,
the court of the Detaining Power shall take into consideration the fact
that the individual to be sentenced (1) is not a national of the Detaining Power, (2) owes it no duty of allegiance, and (3) is in its power
104 During World War II the representatives of the Protecting Power were free
to attend all courts-martial of prisoners of war conducted in the United States,
but did so on only rare occasions. Rich, Brief History 464.
105 This is a "national security" exception that Detaining Powers have apparently found it unnecessary to invoke. Ibid.
106 During the course of the discussion of the report of the Sub-Committee on
Penal Sanctions by Committee II (Prisoners of War) of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the statement was made that the Sub-Committee had decided to inc}~de
in Article 93 (now 103) "two principles of fundamental justice. One was the right
of a prisoner [of war] to a speedy trial, and the other was his right to be considered innocent until he was proven guilty." 2A Final Record 312. The first such
principle was certainly so included; but nowhere in the article drafted by the SubCommittee (ibid., 308), or anywhere else in the Convention, is there any provision
establishing a presumption of innocence if there is no such presumption in the
national law of the Detaining Power. (Article 75 (4) (d) of the 1977 Protocol I
does require such a presumption.)
107 Unfortunately, this appears to be the situation in the People's Republic of
China. Miller, The Law of War 247. See note 75 supra.
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through circumstances beyond his contro}.1°8 It is extremely doubtful
that this provision will have any effect whatsoever on the sentences
imposed on prisoners of war; indeed, in most trials of prisoners of
war, it will be completely irrelevant. When, for example, a prisoner
of war assaults or kills a fellow prisoner of war, why should the court
take into consideration in the sentencing that he is not a national of
the Detaining Power, or that he owes it no duty of allegiance, or that
he is not in the prisoner-of-war camp by choice? How does his situation actually differ from that of a national of the Detaining Power
who, while a convicted criminal serving a sentence in a penitentiary,
assaults or kills a fellow prisoner? Even if the victim is a guard, rather
than a fellow prisoner of war, no reason can be discerned for distinguishing the case from that of the prisoner convict. A prisoner of war
is certainly not entitled to preferential treatment in the sentencing
merely because he is not a national of the Detaining Power and owes
it no duty of allegiance, IO!) and his status of not being a prisoner of war
by choice is identical with that of the prisoner convict who is certainly
not in the penitentiary by choice.
When the court reaches a finding of guilty in the trial of a prisoner
of war and imposes sentence, it will usually do so in the presence of
the prisoner of war concerned. If it does not do so, the first paragraph
of Article 107 specifies that the Detaining Power must immediately
notify him, in a language that he understands, of the judgment and
sentence and of his right of appeal, if any. It must send a "summary
communication" containing the foregoing information to the Protecting Power and to the prisoners' representative; and it must thereafter
inform the Protecting Power of the decision reached by the prisoner
of war with respect to the right of appeal.
Article 106 is directly concerned with the subject of appeals from
conviction and sentence. Once again the national standard is adopted:
the prisoner of war is given the same rights in this regard as are
conferred by the national legislation upon members of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power. Moreover, the prisoner of war must
be fully advised concerning these rights, including the time limit
within which they must be exercised.110 And, finally, the second paralOS The provision actually includes the term "courts or authorities of the Detaining Power" (emphasis added), indicating that it is equally applicable in disciplinary proceedings and judicial prosecutions. It was not mentioned in connection with
the discussion of the former because its impact there is considered to be nonexistent.
109 If he were, then every civilian alien should like,vise be entitled to this special
treatment when sentenced by a foreign court for the commission of a crime.
110 The third paragraph of Article 105, establishing the rights and privileges of
defense counsel, states that he shall continue to have the benefit of these "until
the term of appeal or petition has expired." While the phrase is not notable for its
clarity of meaning, presumably he would retain these rights and privileges until
the final appeal has been decided.
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graph of Article 107 provides that when the conviction becomes final,lll the Detaining Power shall promptly furnish the Protecting
Power with detailed information with respect to (1) the precise
wording of the finding and sentence, l1:! a summary of the preliminary
investigation113 (if any), and of the trial, "emphasizing in particular"
the elements of the "prosecution and the defence" ;114 .and (3) notification, where applicable, of the confinement facility to which the
prisoner of war has been, or wiII be, sent to serve the sentence.
6. Death Sentences
Because of the propensity of the courts of Detaining Powers to
adjudge the death penalty in cases involving prisoners of war without the reluctance frequently displayed by those same courts when
sentencing their own nationals, and because of the irreversibility of
the sentence when executed, there are several provisions of the Convention concerned with this problem. 1l5
The first paragraph of Article 100 requires that prisoners of war
and the Protecting Power be informed "as soon as possible" of the
offenses punishable by death under the laws of the Detaining Power.
Such notification to the Protecting Power early in the conflict will
accomplish the double purpose of making the identity of such offenses
known to the Protecting Power and, under the second paragraph
of Article 100, of freezing the list as of the date of such notification.
However, it is a little difficult to grasp the significance of the requirement of notification to the prisoners of war. A number of prisoners
of war may be captured every day over a period of years. Must the
Detaining Power make a daily announcement of the criminal offenses
punishable by death to each new group of prisoners of war? What is
the effect if it fails to do so? It would have been far more appropriate, and useful, to provide for posting this information in each
prisoner-of-war camp, along with the copy of the Convention and the
regulations, orders, and notices that Article 41 requires to be posted.n 6
111 This may occur because of the decision of the prisoner of war not to appeal,
by affirmance on appeal, by denial of leave to appeal, etc.
11:! Presumably, the "finding" would be "guilty."
113 It would seem that the material accumulated during the course of the preliminary investigation would have little significance after the trial unless the law
of the Detaining Power allows trial on the dossier prepared during that investigation.
114 It is difficult to conceive of a summary of a trial that would fail to include
"the elements of the prosecution and the defence."
Wi Of course, in view of the prohibition contained in the first paragraph of
Article 87 against adjudging any penalty except those that could be adjudged
against a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, this problem will
not arise in a Detaining Power that has, by national action, abolished capital punishment.
116 See pp. 165-167 8upm.
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The second paragraph of Article 100, besides freezing the list of
offenses punishable by death to those so notified to the Protecting Power, also provides that additions to the list may be made only
with the concurrence of the Power of Origin. l17 As to the actual imposition of death sentences, the last paragraph of Article 100 provides that the court must, before pronouncing sentence, specifically have called to its attention the three separate matters that
the second paragraph of Article 87 requires it to take into consideration before sentencing in any case: (1) that the prisoner of
war is not a national of the Detaining Power; (2) that he owes
it no duty of allegiance; and (3) that he is in its power through
circumstances beyond his control. 118 The second paragraph of Article 107 requires that as soon as possible after a sentence to death
has been adjudged (without regard to the possibility or pendency
of an appeal), the Detaining Power furnish to the Protecting Power the detailed notification that is not normally required until after
the decision becomes final. 119 And, finally, Article 101 prohibits the
execution of the death sentence prior to the expiration of at least
six months from the date upon which the Protecting Power actually receives the notification to which reference has just been
made. 120
7. Confinement
A number of the prOVISIOns of the Convention with respect to
permissible punishments, including confinement, have already been
discussed.l2l There are, however, several others that it appears
appropriate to mention at this point in the sequence of events in
a judicial proceeding.

117 Such concurrence would, of course, affect only the prisoners of war who depend on the Power of Origin so concurring.
118 See pp. 337-338 supra. In order to give the second paragraph of Article 87
any significance, it too, like the third paragraph of Article 100, should have had
the requirement that its provisions be called to the attention of the court.
119 See p. 338 supra.
120 The period of delay was increased to six months from the three months of
the second paragraph of Article 66 of the 1929 Convention in order to give the
Power of Origin an adequate opportunity to undertake diplomatic negotiations
concerning the matter, should it be so inclined. 1947 GE Report 230-31. In 1971
the ICRC proposed the discontinuance of the imposition of capital punishment during the course of hostilities "except of persons found guilty of serious war crimes
by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." 1971 GE Documentation, VI
at 52-53.
121 See pp. 322-324 supra.
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The first paragraph of Article 108 again adopts the national
standard of the Detaining Power-this time for the places in which
and the conditions under which the confinement is to be served.
The sentenced prisoner of war will serve his sentence in the same
type of penal institution and under the same conditions as a member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power ;122 but with certain additional provisions that, in fact, establish an international
standard. Thus, Article 108 requires that the conditions of the
confinement conform to the requirements of health and humanity;1:!3 the third paragraph or Article 108 provides that prisoners
of war placed in confinement after judicial prosecution continue
to have the benefit of the privileges established in Article 78 (the
right to make complaints with respect to the conditions of their
confinement) and in Article 126 (the right to confer privately
with representatives of the Protecting Power); and they must be
permitted to send and receive correspondence; to receive at least
one relief parcel during each month of confinement; to exercise
daily in the open air; to have any medical attention that may be
required; to have any spiritual assistance that they may desire;
and to have the benefits of the prohibitions on punishments set
forth in the third paragraph of Article 87.124
Should a prisoner of war who is being judicially prosecuted, or
who has already been convicted, become eligible for repatriation
or accommodation in a neutral country during the course of hostilities, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 109-114, the second
paragraph of Article 115 states that he may only be so repatriated
or accommodated if the Detaining Power consents ;125 the third
paragraph of Article 115 directs the opposing Parties to exchange
the names of prisoners of war detained because of judicial prose122 In the United States, when the sentence includes a punitive discharge and
lengthy confinement, after the discharge has been executed the ex-serviceman is
sometimes transferred from the military confinement facility to a Federal prison.
Inasmuch as a prisoner of war cannot be sentenced to a discharge and continues
to be subject to the military law of the Detaining Power, it would appear that he
should not be so transferred.
123 This requirement of the first paragraph of Article 108 must be read in conjunction with the provisions of the third paragraph of Article 87 prohibiting corporal punishment, imprisonment in premises without daylight, and torture. See
pp. 322-323 supra.
124 Understandably, the privileges to which they are entitled, beyond those included in the national standard, are perceptibly less than those to which a prisoner
of war is entitled when he is confined pursuant to disciplinary sanctions. See pp.
327-328 supra. However, it is not easy to understand why the prohibitions against
punishments that are inhuman, brutal, or dangerous to health, contained in the
last paragraph of Article 89, were not made applicable to judicial punishment as
they are to disciplinary punishment.
125 See pp. 413 and 415 infra.
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cution or conviction. Similarly, the penultimate paragraph of Article 119 provides that when repatriation takes place upon the termination of hostilities, a prisoner of war against whom a judicial
prosecution for "an indictable offense" is pending, or who has
already been convicted of such an offense, may be detained until
the end of the proceedings and until the completion of punishment. 126 And, once again, the last paragraph of Article 119 directs
the opposing Parties to exchange the names of prisoners of war
so detained.

E. CONCLUSIONS
In the nature of things, prisoners of war have frequently been
the victims of injustice at the hands of their captors, such injustice
varying from the extreme of a complete denial of all of the judicial
guarantees recognized as indispensable by the great majority of
national groupings of civilized people to the almost completely
unavoidable human situation of the biased judge. The draftsmen
of the 1949 Convention, building on the precedent of the 1929
Convention and the practices of World War II, attempted to draft
provisions that would ensure, to the maximum extent possible, fair
treatment to the prisoner of war charged by his captors with misconduct, whether of a minor disciplinary or of a major criminal
nature. In the heat of armed conflict it requires strong measures
to ensure fair treatment by the captors of the enemy who have
fallen into their power. It is doubtful that it will become evident
in practice that the draftsmen were as successful in this area of
the Convention as they were in others.
126 See p. 420 infra. Of course, although not specifically mentioned in the
fifth paragraph of Article 119, as it is in the second paragraph of Article 115, there
would be no problem if the Detaining Power consented to the repatriation of the
prisoner of war despite the pending proceedings or the conviction. (Concerning
the Chinese Communist attempt to apply the provisions of the fifth paragraph of
Article 119 in Korea, despite the provision of the Armistice Agreement for the
repatriation of all prisoners of war, see note VII-128 infra.)

